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INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic policy making normally seeks to achieve sustainable economic growth and 
efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation through the use of the appropriate monetary, 
liscal and trade policies. Conventional wisdom postulates that the free market system is the 
best mechanism for the achievement of this goal. However, depending on the initial 
conditions of resource distribution and power relations in society, the free market outcome 
may not be socially acceptable as it tends to be characterised by inequalities. It is under this 
situation of "market failure" to efficiently allocate social goods and services that governments 
normally should intervene with social policies (i.e state regulation of the market to protect the 
public from the bad effects of imperfect competition). Social policies could be in the form 
of resource redistribution, improving access to health, education, housing, water and 
sanitation, intervening in certain markets to improve income distribution etc (Mwanza 1997). 
It is generally difficult to foster development efforts in a nation whose majority population 
is plagued by social insecurity. Thus, macroeconomic policy making, political decisions and 
social security are strongly interdependent. This means thai it is in the interest not only of 
the poor people, but also of national governments, to reduce or minimise social insecurity in 
order to achieve the best from development efforts.
In Zimbabwe in particular, but also in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) countries in general, before the advent of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), 
government(s) operated food subsidy programmes through state owned parastatals which 
controlled food marketing and external trade. Ciovernment(s) also provided input subsidies 
in agriculture and basic industries and in health and education. SAPs demand the 
abandonment of these welfarisl policies which are largely blamed for the stagnation and 
economic crises which characterised the African economies in the 1970s and in the 1980s in 
the case of Zimbabwe. r The main objective of SAPs being to free the economies from 
"government distortions" through excessive controllf, by liberalising/opening up the economy, 
privatising the economy under free market operation and thus revitalise the economy’s growth 
and employment creation paths. In the long-run, a growing economy is a prerequisite for 
social security for the majority of the people as many will be productively engaged and the 
state has access to more resources for possible redistribution. Thus, according to the World 
Bank (1994), the poor should benefit from more and not less adjustment.
2THE FOUNDATIONS OF RURAL SOCIAL INSECURITY IN ZIMBABWE
Unequal Resource Distribution (Land, Water and Infrastructural Support)
Zimbabwe has a total population of around 12 million people of whom 98.8% are Blacks and 
1.2% are European, Asian and other mixed races. Population growth rate is relatively high 
at an average of 3% per annum since 1980. The total land area of approximately 40 million 
hectares is highly unequally distributed among the economic groups. The country has a strong 
political economy background of 90 years of colonial rule (1890-1980) whose influence 
explains a lot of the economic inequalities, which translate into rural social insecurity 
characteristic of present day Zimbabwe (see Table 1).
A notable feature of Zimbabwe’s economy is its dualistic structure. The economy consists 
of a small but relatively advanced urban sector co-existing with a large and relatively 
backward and impoverished rural/communal sector. About 70% of the population (8.4 million 
blacks) live in the rural areas largely as small scale communal area farmers or as large scale 
commercial farm (LSCF) labourers, making agriculture the largest employer of the total 
labour force of the country.
Zimbabwe’s total land area of about 40 million hectares is characterised by major climatic 
variation. The land is divided into five agroecological zones, commonly known as natural 
regions I - V, with soil type and rainfall reliability and hence productivity decreasing as one 
moves from region I to V. Zimbabwe has four major land tenure regimes, namely, the 
Commercial Lands, Communal Lands, Resettlement Areas and State Lands. Commercial 
Lands constitute 35.2% of the total land area in the form of mainly LSCF which average 
3 000 hectares per farm on freehold tenure. 4 000 LSCF are owned by whites while 450 
LSCF are owned by blacks. LSCF occupy 66% of the best land in natural regions I and II. 
There is also a relatively insignificant sub-group in terms of output contribution of 10 600 
small scale commercial farms (SSCF) owned by blacks on freehold title. Communal Areas 
(CAs) occupy 41.8% of the total land area of which 75% is in the worst natural regions IV 
and V (marginal lands unsuitable for viable rainfed cropping) with low and erratic rainfall. 
In CAs grazing lands and natural woodlands are communally managed while arable land is 
allocated to individual families on usufruct rights which can go on for several generations. 
The average size of a communal farm excluding common grazing lands is 2 hectares. It is 
estimated that only about 10% of communal households control over 6 hectares of arable land, 
while about 20% are near landless. Communal lands belong to the state and cannot be bought 
or sold. Resettlement areas, occupying 7.9% of the total land, with a predominantly state 
dominated permit tenure system, enabled only 60 000 black families (6% of the peasants) to 
gain access to more than 12 hectares per family of poor natural region arable land by 1995 
(Moyo 1995; Nyoni 1993; Chipika 1997c).
Unequal land distribution translates into unequal water distribution in Zimbabwe (Land Tenure 
Commission 1994). Existing water laws of 1976 (currently under review) give exclusive 
rights of ownership of surface water to land owners. Communal area farmers are not land 
owners and thus have no right to surface water. About 80% of surface water use in 
Zimbabwe is in irrigation where the LSCF sector accounts for 90% of the country’s irrigated 
land (World Bank 1994).
3TABLE 1
ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY REGIMES
ERA POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
1890-1939 Early colonial era;
Gold rush frustrations;
The turn of settlers to agriculture;
The Land Apportionment Act of 1934 - unequal land 
distribution against the black majority who were allocated 
about 22% of total land area as African Reserves and 8% as 
African Purchase Areas while 51% of the total land was 
designated European Areas.
1953-1963 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland;
Creation of a regional market and start of manufacturing 
sector in Rhodesia;
Consolidation of the Land Apportionment Acts using the 
Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951 which faced 
stiff resistance from the native farmers.
1965-1979 Unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Rhodesia; 
Sanctions by the international community;
Import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and more use 
of economic controls;
The Land Tenure Act of 1969 saw 50% of the total land 
being allocated to the natives as Tribal Trust Lands 
(TTLs) due to mounting war pressure;
1974-79 was the peak of the war of liberation.
1980-1990 First decade of independence;
Economic controls inherited from colonial era;
Growth with Equity policies under a "Socialist" ideology; 
The start of an "ineffective" land redistribution 
programme.
1991-1997 onwards Economic Structural adjustment (ESAP) era - liberalisation 
of the economy.
Land Tenure Commission of 1994 - whose 
recommendations have not yet yieided tangible results in 
terms of land redistribution.
Also as part of colonial policy, unequal land and water distribution was re-enforced by 
unequal provision of agricultural infrastructure and extension in particular and social 
infrastructure in general. The LSCF sector was well serviced with agricultural credit, 
extension and marketing support while all these were scarce or absent in communal areas. 
For example, in 1980 only 2% of CA farmers received formal credit, of the 34 Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) depots in the country, only 3 were in communal area, while the ratio 
of extension workers to CA farmers was 1 : 1 200 (Amin and Kutoka 1989, Agritex 1989).
4At independence in 1980, the new government was aware of these inequalities and 
acknowledged the need for policies to redress the situation. In agriculture the policy thrust 
of the 1980s was aimed at stimulating large scale production, stimulating small farmer cash 
and food crop production and marketing and overall stabilising national food supplies. The 
expected outcome was national food self-sufficiency, improved communal area household 
incomes and general standards of living. Producer price incentives, guaranteed markets even 
for small grains were provided through the GMB and Cotton Marketing Board (CMB). In 
addition, there was an improvement in the provision of agricultural services (credit and 
extension) to communal area farmers through the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and 
the Agricultural Extension Department (AGRITEX) of the Ministry of Agriculture. For 
example, from 1980 to 1986 AFC credit to CAs increased about 50 times in amount and 
about 30 times in the number of loans given. Fertilizer delivered to CAs increased 5 fold and 
improved seed increased 7 fold between 1979 to 1986. By 1985 the GMB had 53 depots of 
which 14 were in CAs together with 55 collection points and 13 mobile units in an effort to 
encourage grain marketing by communal area farmers. The number of communal area 
farmers registered with the GMB increased 4 fold from 60 000 in 1981 to 217 189 in 1985 
while the ratio of extension workers to CA farmers improved to 1 : 800 by 1988 as a result 
of deliberate effort by the state to improve support to communal areas farmers (Amin 1988, 
Harriss 1986, Rohrbach 1989, Agritex 1989).
It is important to note that the above policies of the 1980s were “minimal intervention” 
strategies which left land distribution basically as it was in the colonial era. Even though the 
need for a comprehensive land reform was acknowledged in policy frameworks such as the 
First Five Year National Development Plan of 1986, in practice very little of this “more 
interventionist” policy was implemented. By 1990 a total of only 52 000 communal area 
families had been resettled and these were only 22% of the planned targets of 237 000 
families. The constraints of the Lancaster House Constitution on the acquisition of land were 
cited as the major reasons for this slow progress in land redistribution. Thus, Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural achievements of the 1980s are attributed to the pricing and extension incentives 
and not to the start of some land redistribution process.
The Food, Health and Education Situation in Rural Areas
The outcomes of all the colonial resource distribution policies discussed above were far 
reaching and still determine the character of rural welfare in Zimbabwe today. Rapidly 
increasing human and livestock populations have been among the major factors responsible 
for overgrazing, soil degradation and deforestation in communal areas. FAO estimates of 
1953 show that 60% of Zimbabwe’s C As were then covered by natural woodlands. By 1978 
woodland cover had been reduced to 30% and further down to 18% in the 1990s, with some 
CAs no longer having any natural forests. Of the total of 1.8 million hectares of eroded land 
in Zimbabwe, 83% is estimated to be in CAs. Wetland areas in CAs are also under pressure 
for grazing and cultivation resulting in river and dam siltation (Whitlow and Campbell 1989; 
World Bank 1994).
The pricing, credit and extension policies of the 1980s yielded some positive results. During 
the period 1980-1986 per capita cereal production increased by 80%, maize output doubled 
as did the area under maize and by 1986 there were 2 million tonnes (3 years supply) of 
maize in GMB’s national stocks. By 1989 CA farmers supplied 63% of marketed maize from 
6% in 1980, 90% of sunflower and an increasing share of cotton. However, from 1987
5onwards the “success” story became gloomy as bottlenecks in the then controlled economy 
led to the reduction or stoppage of the distribution of agricultural inputs to communal areas. 
In addition several other undesirable trends started surfacing in the late 1980s which included 
the continuation of the need for drought relief and public works programmes in the communal 
areas and reported high levels of child malnutrition co-existing with seeming national food 
self-sufficiency. An analysis of this paradox showed a highly skewed distribution of the 
“success”. For example, only 18 out of the 170 communal areas in the country contributed 
about 70% of the marketed maize in good years and as much as 90% in drought years. These 
18 CAs are the few located in the higher rainfall provinces of Mashonaland West, East and 
Central. The majority of the communal areas in the drier natural regions IV and V were in 
fact consistently food deficit areas (Amin and Kutoka 1989). Further research evidence 
showed that it was the small click (25% of CA farmers) of “master farmers” who benefited 
from the state support package of the 1980s leaving the majority still socially insecure 
(Vengesa 1985, Chipika S. 1990). It was only at the end of the 1980s decade that policy 
makers began to accept that there was a problem of structural poverty in Zimbabwe’s rural 
areas which needed policy to effectively address it.
The World Bank 1996, using the Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey of 1990/91 
estimated that 25% of Zimbabwe’s population live in poverty with 76% of the poor and 82% 
of the very poor being all people living in the communal areas. Ministry of Public Service, 
Labour and Social Welfare 1996, estimated that 60% of the population was in poverty with 
(he majority again being in communal areas. These results are not only indicative of the 
possibility of rising poverty and social insecurity in the rural areas, but even as individual 
surveys, they indicate high levels of social insecurity in rural areas. Tables 2 and 3 below on 
government’s drought relief program to alleviate food insecurity in the rural areas confirm the 
chronic nature of this problem in the nation. The statistics show that food relief in the rural 
areas is a permanent programme for government and not just a feature related to drought as 
initially intended. Requests for more food seem to have increased significantly since 1991.
The colonial regime policies of discrimination against the majority blacks was not only 
evident in agriculture, but also in the provision of basic essential services such as health and 
education. At independence in 1980 the new government’s efforts to redress imbalances in 
this area were much more evident under the policies of "free’Vstate financed primary education 
and basic health care policies together with widespread literacy campaigns for all age groups. 
In fact the first decade of independence 1980-1990 is noted for its high scores in social 
achievements and less scores in productive activities of the economy as a whole. Zimbabwe 
scored highly in child immunisation, primary health, education and family planning. The 
nation realised universal coverage in immunisation moving from 25% in 1980 to 86% by 
1990, while infant mortality dropped from 88/1000 live births in 1980 to 61/1000 live births 
by 1990. In education, primary school enrolments doubled during the period 1980-1990, rural 
secondary schools increased 8 fold between during the same period accompanied by a 10 fold 
increase in secondary school enrolments (Davies, Sanders and Shaw 1991; Mhone 1995; 
Chipika 1997b). Nothing much happened in the rural areas in the areas of housing, safe water 
and sanitation apart from a few donor funded projects scattered throughout the country, 
whose impact has not been very significant.
The education and health benefits of the 1980s are however, currently being eroded under the 
new ESAP environment under which people either have to pay for these services or have to
6do with ill equiped institutions as government is required to tighten its expenditure (more on 
this will be discussed in the next section). The unfortunate thing about the expansion in 
education during this period was that economic growth and employment creation lagged 
behind. Each year 300 000 job seekers (mainly school leavers) entered the job market when 
on average 30 000 new jobs were created in industry (ZCTU Interim Report, 1995). Thus, 
a serious problem of unemployment surfaced in the late 1980s. The majority of these 
unemployed youths were from the rural areas, whose families had sacrificed their little 
agricultural income in order to give secondary education tq their children in the hope that 
when they got employed the welfare of the rural families would improve. The quality of the 
education itself was also problematic in that it prepared labour for employment in the formal 
sector and not for self-employment in the non-formal sectors.
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNAL AREAS WITH:
YEAR Very Poor 
Harvest
Poor Harvest Average
Harvest
Good Harvest Very Good 
Harvest
1981 46 2 25 3 24
1983 85 4 3 1 6
1984 65 10 13 3 10
1985 17 5 16 5 56
1986 47 5 18 7 24
1987 79 4 9 1 7
1988 19 15 33 8 25
1989 24 10 28 7 31
1990 35 10 24 3 28
1991 32 8 34 5 21
1992 94 4 0 1 1
1993 II 9 7 6 66
1994 24 8 26 5 37
1995 87 5 - 3 I 5
1996 22 7 31 5 34
AVERAGE 46 7 18 4 25
Source: USAID Famine Early Warning System and the National Early Warning Unit, AGRITEX, 1997.
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NATIONAL DROUGHT RELIEF ACTIVITIES 1983 - 1993
YEAR PEOPLE 
REQUESTING 
(Cumulative 
Request Counts per 
Year)
PEOPLE FED 
(Cumulative 
Feeding Counts per 
(Year)
GRAIN
DISTRIBUTED
(Metric
Tonnes)
1982/83 4 475 012 8 630 628 93 743
1983/84 18 348 860 17 565 142 174 438
1984/85 11 015 432 7 203 621 61 753
1985/86 1 663 540 843 979 7 470
1986/87 10 951 030 5 021 507 51 651
1987/88 21 572 692 II 738 715 114 123
1988/89 4 070 296 1 716 377 20 343
1989/90 14 232 259 5 732 921 59 223
1990/91 23 623 158 13 110 098 131 123
1991/92 27 528 873 12 403 808 131 618
1992/93 52 753 071 44 148 790 349 729
Source: Socinl Welfare Stalisticnl Overview; Ministry of Agriculture 1997.
ECONOMIC REFORM (ESAP) POLICIES AND RURAL SOCIAL INSECURITY IN 
ZIMBABWE 1991 - 1997
From Controls to Liberalisation of the Economy
In terms of macro-economic management, the first decade of independence in Zimbabwe 
1980-1990, is known as the era of controls. The state played a major role in all the major 
sectors of the economy owning a chain of parastatals in agricultural marketing, public utility 
provision and strategic industries. Examples include, Dairi Marketing Board (DMB), Cotton 
Marketing Board (CMB), Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Agricultural Marketing Authority 
(AMA), Cold Storage Commission (CSC), Agricultural Rural Development Authority 
(ARDA), Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), 
Zimbabwe electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), Air Zimbabwe, Post and Telecommunications 
Corporation (PTC), Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), Zimbabwe Development 
Council (ZDC), Investment Development Council (IDC), Zimbabwe United Passenger 
Company (ZUPCO), Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), Zimbabwe Stale 
Trading Corporation (ZSTC) and the list continues. In the labour and investment market, 
minimum wages were set by government accompanied by stringent labour laws that largely 
protected the worker. Investment approval went through a long process of screening and 
approval. Prices of agricultural inputs and outputs together with prices of basic foodstuffs 
were all controlled by government. Interest rates and exchange rates were administered by 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe such that nominal interest rates remained constant at 13%
8during the period 1981-1989 very close to the inflation rate which averaged 12-13% in the 
same period. On the international trade arena, import and export controls in the form of 
licenses together with a stringent and corrupt foreign exchange allocation system were the 
order of the day.
The outcomes of this controlled regime were broadly, stagnating private investment 
particularly in the manufacturing sector Which is the largest contributor to gross domestic 
product (GDP), high unemployment as the economy failed to absorb the large numbers of 
school leavers from the expanded education system, shortages of foreign exchange, basic 
goods and services leading to unrecorded inflation, budget deficit problems and continued 
massive poverty in the rural areas in the absence of an effective land redistribution 
programme. Pressure for change culminated in the adoption of the orthodox World Bank/ 
IMF Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991.
ESAP: The Package, Aims, Objectives and Outcomes
The broad aim of ESAP was to create incentives for private investment in manufacturing, 
reduce government deficits, encourage exports, allow free market forces to determine efficient 
resource allocation in the economy and hence generate economic growth and employment. 
The package consists of four key components:
(i) Trade Liberalisation which involved moving away from regulatory controls on 
international trade and foreign exchange allocation, use of appropriate exchange rate 
policies involving devaluation of the local currency to encourage exports as well as 
expanding the Open General Import License (OGIL) and tariff reforms.
(ii) Budget Policy/Fiscal Deficit Reduction which was targeted at reducing fiscal deficits 
to less than 5% of GDP by 1995 and increase efficiency in the public service. Budget 
reduction measures included the elimination of subsidies of all forms, public sector 
enterprise reform, cost recovery in education and health and public service job 
rationalisation aimed at reducing the size of the public service.
(iii) Domestic Deregulation/Monetary and Interest Rate Policy which involved a shift from 
direct controls to market based monetary and interest rate policy instruments. Savings 
mobilisation and inflation containment at one digit levels by 1995 were major outcome 
targets. Domestic deregulation also involved removing price and wage controls and 
the many consumer subsidies of the 1980s. This was meant to increase free 
competition and give firms the opportunity to respond to market opportunities.
(iv) Social Dimensions o f Adjustment: The Social Development Fund (SDF) which was 
meant to mitigate the social costs of adjustment to the vulnerable groups and the poor 
who include women, children, the unemployed and the retrenched during the 
transitional period of economic adjustment. The policy instruments used in the 
implementation included the Employment Training Programme (ETP) and the Social 
Welfare Programme consisting of commodity specific subsidy on food and exemption 
from cost recovery for the vulnerable and poor groups.
The reform programme, ESAP 1991-95, was largely a failure and this is partly blamed on the 
way the sequencing of the reform components was done. Domestic decontrol and trade 
liberalisation were implemented first while the reduction in the fiscal deficit and the SDA 
lagged behind. This sequencing is sometimes described as a “partial implementation” of the 
ESAP.
9Fiscal and Monetary Outcomes
The broad outcome of ESAP was macroeconomic instability characterised by high government 
budget deficits, which remained at around 10% of GDP and were largely domestically 
financed. This increased the demand for loanable funds, thus pushing interest rates up. This, 
together with a tight monetary policy, pushed interest rates to unbearable levels of 40% - 48% 
from 1992 to 1994, rising from 13% in the 1980s (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 1996). High 
interest rates have crowded out private investment and suppressed economic growth and 
employment creation.
High interest rates, high tariffs on imported inputs and price decontrol under oligopolistic 
conditions, fuelled the rise in prices, particularly of basic goods. This worsened the plight of 
the poor and vulnerable groups. The prices of food and medical care in 1995 Were more than 
5 times their 1990 levels.- Inflation shot from an average of 15% in the 1980s to 42% in 1992 
and down to 23% by 1995 against ESAP targets of 10% (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 1996 
and Chipika, Chibanda and Kadenge, 1997).
High debt servicing costs for both domestic and foreign debt by government are reducing the 
funds available to essential public services like health and education. The Zimbabwean 
economy moved from an indebtedness level of around 50% of GDP in the 1980s to more than 
80% of GDP by the 1990s. In addition, slow economic growth and compression of wages, 
all contribute to the constraining of the government revenue base. This, combined with 
reduced taxes and weak tax collection capacity, constrains government’s public expenditure 
capacity (Chipika, Chibanda, & Kadenge, 1997).
An important component of fiscal policy under economic reform is the move towards efficient 
revenue collection systems by the state machinery. In Zimbabwe government collects the bulk 
of its revenue from direct taxes such as income tax and corporate tax. A small percentage 
of the revenue comes from indirect taxes such as sales tax. Sales tax is a broad base tax 
collected at the retail level where goods are sold to the final consumer. At the manufacturing 
and wholesaling levels companies just use their tax numbers to acquire goods without directly 
paying tax at that point. This system is said to be prone to high levels of tax evasion as false 
numbers are used and people out of business continue to use their tax numbers etc. High 
sales tax levels increase the desire of evasion while at the same time the consumers face high 
prices.
Zimbabwe is on its way to introducing the value-added tax system (VAT). Under the VAT 
system, tax is collected at each stage in the manufacturing process as well as at the wholesale 
and retail stage. This system is likely to generate more revenue for the state as the risk of 
evasion is reduced. The final consumer however, is likely to face higher prices as low price 
tax-evasion benefits are eradicated in the economy and oligopolistic firms pass the whole tax 
burden to the Consumer (i.e it is possible for VAT to fuel inflation). It is generally postulated 
that VAT works at its best in macroeconomically stable economies, a condition which 
Zimbabwe does not currently satisfy. A remote advantage for the rural community lies in that 
when the state has more revenue, its capacity to support rural development projects will be 
strengthened in the long run.
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Exchange Rate and Trade Outcomes
In trade the Zimbabwe dollar has experienced a heavy devaluation from Z$0.4/US$1 in 1990 
to Z$9.31/US$1 by 1995 i.e a 2227.5% devaluation and currently (January 1998) the currency 
is very weak at Z$19/US$1. This was intended to boost exports, an outcome which has not 
been realised in general. Instead, the country which is heavily dependent on the imports of 
machinery and chemicals has been hard hit by expensive import prices (i.e imported inflation). 
Several rural households, realising that low productivity small scale agriculture will not afford 
them improved welfare have joined the growing urban informal sector in cross border trading 
with South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Mauritius. The devaluation of the 
local currency has directly hit these small traders hard.
ESAP and Employment Outcomes
The SDF’s two major elements, of employment and training of retrenched workers, and 
social welfare (school and health fees exemption and food money) have generally been 
unsuccessful. The SDF funds had reached very few of the beneficiaries, e.g 20% for school 
fees and 4% for food money . Cumbersome eligibility criteria and lack of funding and 
implementing manpower are largely to blame for this failure.
Real wages fell by 30% between 1990 - 94 and under normal growth conditions this should 
have stimulated employment creation. Growth in total employment since 1991 has averaged 
1.6% per annum compared to targets of 3% per amium which would match the annual 
increase in Zimbabwe’s working age population. Currently, the unemployment rate in 
Zimbabwe is estimated to be very high at 40-50%.
Retrenchment of workers has been heavy, with 32 440 jobs lost by December 1995 in the 
formal sector compared to a target of 20 000 (Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare 1991). The textile and engineering sub-sectors were hard hit by company 
closures. These income and employment trends impacted negatively on urban households who 
rely mostly on wages.
It is noted that labour-intensive horticulture and tourism have grown strong under ESAP 
(Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 1996). Rapid growth is also noted in the informal sector where 
employment grew by 14% between 1991 - 93, with employment growth rates of 35% in 
transport and 23% in trading (Chipika, Chibanda & Kateera, 1996).
The impact of all these outcomes on rural remittances needs to be assessed since it is possible 
that these may have been reduced'or become negative on rural agriculture and welfare in 
general or they may have remained unchanged or increased if remitters cut back on their own 
consumption budgets and gave priority to rural investment as a form of social security. It 
is also important to assess the extent and nature of r(iral poverty under the ESAP period. 
Continued redundances and salary cuts in public sector and parastatals may lead to widespread 
impoverishment and environmental encroachment by new and under resourced farmers. The 
failure of ESAP in general to create formal employment for school leavers might create 
conditions for commercialisation of forest products by the youths in the informal sector 
thereby worsening any hopes for sustainable development in the rural areas, thus increasing 
social insecurity in the long run.
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ESAP, Health and Education Outcomes
There is no doubt that Zimbabwe generated favourable indicators in health and education in 
the 1980s. Basic health Indicators like child mortality; Maternal niortality and child nutrition 
(Weight-for-Age) status have all worsened under ESAP.withthe exception of stunting which 
has improved,: probably because of the continued government child feeding programmes 
(Chipika, Chibahda & Kateera, 1996)/ ■
The explanations for worsening basic health indicators lie in several factors including the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, fall in income levels, decline in public spending on health from 6.4% 
of government’s total budget in 1990/91 to 4.3% in 1995/96 i.e a 30% decline. Real per 
capita spending dropped 40% in 199,5/96 compared to 1990/91 (Government of Zimbabwe 
Budget Statements). There are indications that preventative and primary health care, which 
benefit the poor most, have been declining. Per capita non-wage recurrent spending declined 
by 42% between 1990/91-arid 1995/96 affecting negatively the ability of public health 
institutions to acquire basic drugs and supplies; The HIV/AIDS pandemic affecting about 
10% of the population, mostly in the economically active age group (20-45) years, is putting 
severe strain on the formal health care system, the rural areas were most of the terminal cases 
are dumped for “home based care” and on the economy as a whole. The time of severe 
hardships from external factors such: as AIDS and drought is the most inappropriate time to 
cut back government real expenditure in essential social services.
Public spending on education has not been spared, declining steadily from 18% of total budget 
in 1990/91 to 15% in 1994/95; Non- staff costs, which include supplies and teaching 
materials, which benefit the poor, accounted for 10% of the primary school budget in the 
1980s but by 1993/94 were less than 5%. Real resources per primary pupil fell by 33% from 
1990/91 to 1994/95, while the budgets for higher education rose. The proportion of qualified 
teachers has increased for both primary and secondary levels and O-level pass rates have also 
been getting better. Unfortunately, rates of completion of primary school by girls has dropped 
and this is likely to affect children from poor families.
It looks like investment in human'Capital'ribeds revisiting to restore or to increase previous 
levels, if the gains made in the 1980s1 are not fo be eroded. This investment is crucial for the 
sustenance of economic growth^. A* reduction in human capital investment increases 
vulnerability to poverty/social insecurity for future generations.
It is necessary to understand this background in order to appreciate the decision making 
environment of rural households. Practically, they have become responsible for their 
expenditures on social services like education and health which were formally provided free 
by government because while the policy still stipulates that primary education and rural health 
centres are non paying, in reality the institutions have no drugs and adequate teaching 
materials so that the rural households in need of these services end up paying for them in the 
urban areas. Thus, cost-recovery measures apply to them as well. They have also to meet 
the cost of previously subsidised farm inputs. In addition to meeting the cost of these 
services, their own consumption needs are increasing because those imported or with an 
imported component have become more expensive because of the devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar, and further inflation has taken its toll as well. Thus, within their resource, 
constrained environment, rural households may be geiting more and more socially insecure.
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ESAP and Agriculture Outcomes
Underlying the whole question o f the impact o f macroecotiomic policies on rural livelihoods, 
is the issue o f peasant behaviour or the peasant household decision-making process. The main 
objectives o f rural households when they engage in agricultural and other non-agricultural 
activities will determine how they respond to changing economic conditions. In Sub-Sahara 
Africai#(SAA) countries in general and Zimbabwe in particular, research evidence suggests 
that poor peasant households who are in the majority do not aim at profit maximisation from 
agricultural production. Their major concern is household food security (first and foremost 
from their own production) such that risk-aversion behaviour dominates the decision-making 
process o f poor households (Ellis 1988; Chipika 1994).
Chipika (1994) found for the case o f Zimbabwe’s communal areas that 60% o f the sample 
households were ’strongly risk-averse’ and these were mainly the poor and lower-middle 
groups o f households (using socio-economic strata assessment); 25% were ’strongly risk- 
taking’ in behaviour and these were ftiainly the top-belter-off and a few upper-middle group 
households* while 15% were ’risk- neutral’ and these were mainly die upper-middle 
households. These results generally suggest that risk-aversion behaviour is rife among the 
majority poor peasants in Zimbabwe and it decreases with an increase in wealth and security. 
Risk-averse households regard involvement in the cash economy and venturing into new 
productivity-raising innpvations as risky undertakings ’even though higher producer prices (if 
they caniaccess them at all) would normally justify investment in farm working capital. 
However, the 25% risk-takers are expected to respond positively to market opportunities as 
they did to the incentives o f the 1980s and these have been observed to grow more cotton, 
sunflower and venturing into tobacco, which are lucrative cash crops under ESAP.
(i) Liberalised Grain Marketing
The impact o f liberalised grain marketing (leading sometimes to the closure o f Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) depots to reduce government deficit and improve marketing 
efficiency) is controversial. Some contend that the poor have benefited from cheaper mealie- 
rneal prices, cash payment, farm-gate collection and provision o f packaging (Addison 1996), 
while others argue that marketing problems have arisen with the re-introduction o f  
unscrupulous middleman, worsening the welfare o f communal area poor households. 
Mukamuri (1997) reports that farmers in Mangwende, Chivi and Hurungwe communal areas 
also complained o f very low prices offered for their maize by private traders sometimes under 
unfair barter trading terms. While LSCF may benefit from higher maize producer prices as 
they participate on the free niarketlradipg like the ZIMACE market, communal farmers do 
not even know about this market and do not have the capacity to respond quickly to the 
market’s demands o f fast delivery of large quantities o f maize. Instead, the majority of 
communal area households are food deficit households and net buyers o f grain, such that the 
ever increasing processed mealie-meal prices which follow the trend o f higher free market 
maize producer and selling prices, are worsening their food insecurity situation.
(ii) Fiscal Deficit Reduction and Public Enterprise Reform
The reduction in subsidies for food, fertilisers and agricultural inputs has the potential to carry 
very negative consequences for the rural households. Poor farmers may respond by clearing 
more marginal lands in order to increase or maintain agricultural output levels Under reduced 
yields i.e discouragement o f more intensive farming or they may resign to the declining
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yields and cry out for more government drought relief food supplies. All these have the 
effect oT.,rgyersing even the limited achievements of the 1980s which resulted from 
guar^teeaproducer prices, access to markets and agricultural extension as well as the 
subsidi'sedjf'ertilizer and agricultural inputs package to the communal farmers.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF RURAL SOCIAL
SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE
Conclusions
* From the above discussion there is ho doubt that high levels of social insecurity in all 
its multiple dimensions exist in the rural areas of Zimbabwe where the majority of the 
population lives.
' -
* It is also important to note that rural social insecurity has its roots deeply entrenched 
in the unequal resource distribution fostered by colonial political and economic 
policies. The failure so far by the independence government to redistribute economic 
resources, and in particular agricultural land has perpetuated rural poverty and social 
insecurity. The benefits from “minimal interventionist” policies such as the 
agricultural support package of the 1980s to the communal farmers are limited in the 
face of a major land constraint faced by these farmers. Land tenure security would 
also go a long way in alleviating poverty if it specifically empowers women who 
constitute about 80% of the rural population supplying 60%-75% of the labour force 
in agriculture. Generally, women control fewer resources, earn lower incomes, have 
less access to higher education and skills acquisition and are often restricted to their 
reproductive roles and hence they constitute a large proportion of the pdbr. Thus, 
addressing the socio-economic situation of women may go a long way in reducing 
rural social insecurity.
* Even though droughts have become a permanent feature of the SADC countries, their 
management is still largely on an ad-hoc basis and heavily reliant on external aid to 
manage the worst crises situations. The incidence of droughts in the region is 
predicted to worsen with time because of global warming and it is high time drought 
is internalised into the policy environment rather than leave it as an exogenous factor. 
This can be done through coordinated effort and drought management strategies at 
regional level. Such strategies may include research into and adoption of drought 
resistant crop and livestock varieties. At country level, it is worthwhile investing in 
rural irrigation infrastructure. *
* Food insecurity in the rural areas is both a supply and demand effective demand issue. 
An important component of effective demand in non-agricultural income either from 
formal employment or from many other self-employment, income generating projects. 
There is some potential in value-adding small processing agricultural and non- 
agricultural projects in both the urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe which could 
improve household social security. Support services in the form of skills, appropriate 
technology, market information, credit etc is what is required in order to give effective 
demand a push.
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* Bringing structural adjustment policies into this already problematic rural situation has 
simply compounded/increased the problem of rural social insecurity. For whatever 
reason(s) that can be cited for the economic hardships and macroeconomic instability 
experienced by Zimbabwe during ESAP, the evidence so far points to the fact that 
adjustment policies contributed to rising poverty levels.
The failure to attract significant levels of private investment, labour deregulation, 
retrenchments in the public and private sectors, closure of the so called inefficient 
companies, an incompatible education system etc have all contributed to rising 
unemployment, affecting negatively the welfare of both rural and urban households.
Reduction in government spending, unselective price decontrols and subsidy 
withdrawals expose large sections of the population to unbearable consumer price 
increases and the rural community with the least income are most affected.
Public expenditure cuts accompanied by user fees policies, reduce the poor’s access 
to sometimes basic and essential services such as health, education and agricultural 
extension information.
Agricultural parastatal reform and removal of subsidies from agricultural inputs worsen 
the position of the small scale communal farmers most of whom depended on 
government support. Most of them will not benefit from the free market producer 
price increases and will end up receiving low prices from the few unscrupulous private 
traders operating an oligopolistic market in the rural areas.
Under this economic stress accompanied by a pooriy administered and poorly funded 
SDF, rural households end up adopting their own survival strategies which are not 
sustainable in the long run. Research evidence shows that such strategies include 
commercialising natural forest products (when the forest resource itself is fast 
depleting in the rural areas), moving into extensive agriculture thus depleting and 
degrading the fragile marginal and grazing lands even more, moving into cash 
cropping at the expense of food crops, informal sector activities such as trading, crime 
and prostitution, reducing household consumption, relying on government drought 
relief food, relying more on traditional and faith healing, withdrawing girl children 
from school, relying more on informal lending etc.
Implications for the Future
As the nation of Zimbabwe moves on into the second phase of the economic reform 
programme, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 
(ZIMPREST), it is important for social policy to be treated more seriously in macroeconomic 
and sectoral policy making. Land redistribution is a must and not an option in the case of 
Zimbabwe if one is to think of starting the process of eradicating rural poverty and social 
insecurity. Part of the process of policy making must be bejing able to foresee how these 
policies may impact directly or indirectly on the welfare of the majority as well as on 
important productive sectors of the economy so that adequate cushioning mechanisms, if 
possible, can be put in place. Monitoring and evaluation of policies during implementation 
is a key step to “smelling danger before it strikes” so that steps can be taken to “keep the 
horse on track before the race is over”. As the author is concluding this paper, the country
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is going through one o f the worst riots ever (which has seen the destruction of business 
property worth millions o f dollars) over basic food price increases. This shows that there is 
a limit to which households can take on the pressure o f economic stress.
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